MATRIMONIAL PROCEEDINGS IN INDIA: RIGHTS, CONDUCT, AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES

A Practitioner’s Legal Reference on Dos & Don’ts, Adultery vs. Bigamy, Cohabitation Pendente Lite, and the Adulterous Husband

By Law Chamber of Amit K Pateria | Expert Speaks | Legal Awareness Series Divorce proceedings in India seldom resolve in isolation. The filing of a petition under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) almost invariably triggers satellite disputes of profound consequence: the custody of children, interim maintenance, residence rights, and allegations of matrimonial fault — chief among them adultery and abandonment. This article addresses each dimension comprehensively, covering the statutory framework, the Supreme Court’s settled jurisprudence, the practical conduct expected of both parties, and the critical legal distinctions that determine the outcome of such proceedings.

PART I: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

Three statutes form the legislative architecture of custody and guardianship law in India and must be read in harmony. The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 Section 7 empowers the court to appoint a guardian of a minor whenever necessary for the minor’s welfare. Section 17 requires the court to be guided exclusively by what appears to be for the welfare of the minor. Section 17(3) permits the court to consider the preference of a minor old enough to form an intelligent preference. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (HMGA) Section 6 establishes the hierarchy of natural guardianship: in the case of a boy or unmarried girl, the father is the first natural guardian, thereafter the mother — with the proviso that custody of a child who has not completed five years of age shall ordinarily be with the mother. Critically, Section 13 of the HMGA declares the welfare of the minor to be the paramount consideration in every appointment or declaration of a guardian, overriding the formal statutory hierarchy. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) Section 26 empowers the family court to make interim or final orders in respect of the custody, maintenance, and education of minor children at any stage of matrimonial proceedings. Section 13(1)(i) provides the ground of adultery for divorce; Section 13(1)(ia) provides the ground of cruelty; Section 24 provides for interim maintenance pendente lite; and Section 25 provides for permanent alimony.

PART II: THE PARAMOUNT CRITERION — WELFARE OF THE CHILD

The welfare of the child is the polar star of all custody adjudications in India. It is both a statutory mandate and a constitutional imperative under Article 21, read with Article 39(f), of the Constitution of India. No allegation of parental fault — whether adultery, abandonment, or cruelty — displaces this criterion. The court acts as parens patriae, and its inquiry is child-centred, not parent-punishing.

Key Supreme Court Decisions

Nil Ratan Kundu & Anr. v. Abhijit Kundu, (2008) 9 SCC 413 “The legal position is well settled that in a matter of custody of a child, the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child and not the legal rights of a particular party.” The Court held that welfare encompasses physical comfort, emotional security, moral well-being, and educational opportunity — and requires a holistic assessment of all relevant circumstances. Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal, (2009) 1 SCC 42 The Supreme Court held unequivocally that there is no legal rule that a male child must invariably be given to the father, or that the father as natural guardian has a superior claim to custody. The welfare of the child — regardless of gender — is the sole operative criterion. The court is not required to act as an arbiter of the moral conduct of the parties. Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, AIR 1973 SC 2090 One of the earliest and most frequently cited authorities on custody, the Supreme Court held that children are not mere chattels or property of their parents. The issue of custody must be decided solely by the principle of welfare of the minor — not by weighing the rival claims of the parents. Gita Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, (1999) 2 SCC 228 The Supreme Court read down Section 6(a) of the HMGA to hold that the word ‘after’ does not require the father’s death or permanent incapacity. The mother is an equal natural guardian, and her right to custody is not subordinate but co-equal with the father’s, subject always to the welfare criterion.

PART III: ABANDONMENT OF A CHILD — LEGAL MEANING AND BURDEN OF PROOF

The allegation that a mother has “abandoned” her child carries moral gravity but is a term of art in law. Through judicial interpretation, abandonment in the custody context means a voluntary, intentional, and permanent relinquishment of all parental rights and obligations, without just cause or excuse. Mere physical absence — particularly where such absence results from matrimonial conflict, a wife’s departure from the matrimonial home on account of cruelty, or the husband’s own act of separating the child — does not constitute abandonment in law. The burden of proving abandonment rests squarely upon the party asserting it, to the civil standard of preponderance of probabilities.

The Legal Test for Abandonment

The court must determine: (a) whether the separation of the mother from the child was voluntary; (b) whether the mother demonstrated an intention to permanently forsake her parental responsibilities; and (c) whether the circumstances of the matrimonial dispute — including the husband’s own conduct — caused or compelled the separation. Where a wife leaves the matrimonial home due to cruelty and the child remains with the husband’s family, that separation cannot in law be characterised as abandonment. Mausami Moitra Ganguli v. Jayant Ganguli, (2008) 7 SCC 673 The Supreme Court held that allegations made by one spouse against the other in the course of acrimonious litigation must be assessed with caution and not treated as established facts. A mother’s temporary non-residence with the child, in the context of matrimonial conflict, is insufficient evidence of abandonment.

PART IV: ADULTERY AND CHILD CUSTODY — DOES ADULTERY DISQUALIFY A PARENT?

The clear answer provided by a long line of Supreme Court decisions is: adultery, by itself, does not disentitle a parent from custody of the child. The welfare of the child — not the moral conduct of the parent as a spouse — is the only operative criterion. A parent may be morally imperfect in the matrimonial sphere and yet remain a capable and fit custodian. The relevant inquiry is whether the parent’s conduct or circumstances demonstrably harm the child’s welfare — not whether the parent was a faithful spouse. Roxann Sharma v. Arun Sharma, (2015) 8 SCC 318 The fact that a mother has been found to have committed adultery does not justify depriving her of custody, particularly where she is otherwise a competent and caring parent and the child’s welfare would be best served by remaining with her. Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan, (2020) 3 SCC 67 Custody is not a reward for good conduct or a punishment for bad conduct in matrimonial relations. Courts must not conflate a spouse’s failure as a marriage partner with a parent’s fitness to care for the child. Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2018) 2 SCC 189 (Constitution Bench) Section 497 IPC criminalising adultery was struck down as unconstitutional — violating Articles 14, 15, and 21. The Court affirmed that a woman’s sexuality and autonomy are constitutionally protected and that she cannot be treated as the property of her husband. Adultery may remain a ground for divorce but is no longer a criminal offence and cannot serve as a presumptive disqualifier from civil rights, including custody.

PART V: DOS AND DON’TS DURING DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS

Once divorce proceedings are filed, every act and omission of both parties carries potential legal consequence. Courts observe the conduct of parties throughout proceedings, and early missteps — including intemperate conduct, social media disclosures, unilateral custody arrangements, or harassment — can be difficult to overcome.

THE WIFE — What She Should Do

Preserve all evidence of cruelty — medical records, police complaints, photographs, communication records. File under Section 498A IPC / Section 85 BNS where cruelty is ongoing.
File a Domestic Violence complaint under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA) for residence orders, protection orders, and monetary relief. The pendency of divorce proceedings does not bar PWDVA proceedings — Saraswathy v. Babu, (2014) 3 SCC 712.
Apply promptly for interim maintenance under Section 24 HMA (pendente lite) or Section 144 BNSS (formerly Section 125 CrPC). Delay in applying may weigh against the applicant.
Apply for custody under Section 26 HMA at the earliest opportunity. Document your role as primary caregiver meticulously — school pickups, medical visits, daily routines — as this evidence directly counters any allegation of abandonment.
Retain all electronic evidence — WhatsApp messages, emails, and social media evidence. Electronic evidence is admissible when properly certified under Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Shafhi Mohammad v. State of HP, (2018) 2 SCC 801.
Comply punctually with all court dates, directions, and interim orders. Non-compliance is treated as contempt and severely prejudices the case.
Seek an injunction restraining the husband from alienating or dissipating matrimonial property during proceedings, particularly where there is risk of fraudulent transfer.
Engage genuinely with court-directed mediation. Courts view cooperative conduct favourably — K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226.

THE WIFE — What She Should Not Do

Do not cohabit publicly with another man during the pendency of proceedings without understanding the full legal consequences regarding maintenance and custody. This is analysed in detail in Part VII below.
Do not unilaterally remove the child from the jurisdiction of the court or the country without court permission. This constitutes contempt and may amount to child abduction — Surya Vadanan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2015) 5 SCC 450.
Do not make reckless allegations — of adultery, cruelty, or criminal conduct — without evidentiary foundation. Courts penalise parties who make false allegations.
Do not obstruct visitation — withholding children from the father in violation of any interim visitation order signals parental alienation, which courts treat as seriously harmful conduct — Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh, (2017) 3 SCC 231.
Do not engage in social media attacks, public vilification, or circulation of the husband’s private material. Courts have awarded costs against parties conducting media trials of matrimonial disputes.
Do not abandon the matrimonial home voluntarily without evidence of cruelty, a residence order under PWDVA, or urgent safety necessity. Voluntary departure without cruelty may be used to allege desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) HMA.
Do not sign any settlement or waiver of property rights without independent legal advice and court recording. Informal agreements are routinely reneged upon.

THE HUSBAND — What He Should Do

Comply with all maintenance orders made under Section 24 HMA or Section 144 BNSS, even if the quantum is disputed. Non-payment may result in imprisonment. Appeal the quantum through lawful channels.
Honour all visitation orders granted to the wife in good faith. Demonstrating cooperative co-parenting is a significant positive factor in custody adjudication.
Document your care of the child — school records, medical treatment, daily routines — as part of the welfare evidence in custody proceedings.
Disclose all income and assets accurately and fully when required by the court. Concealment leads to adverse inferences and enhanced maintenance orders.
Preserve evidence of the wife’s alleged misconduct through lawful means only — documentary records, witness testimony, duly certified communication records.

THE HUSBAND — What He Should Not Do

Do not commit, threaten, or facilitate any act of domestic violence during proceedings. Any such act simultaneously strengthens Section 498A, PWDVA, and cruelty-based divorce claims against the husband.
Do not enter into a second marriage or cohabit with another woman before the divorce decree is made absolute. This constitutes bigamy under Section 82 BNS (formerly Section 494 IPC), renders the second marriage void under Section 11 HMA, and constitutes the gravest cruelty towards the first wife.
Do not alienate or encumber matrimonial property without court sanction. Courts routinely grant injunctions and take a grave view of attempts to defeat maintenance and property claims.
Do not use the children as instruments of pressure. Coaching children to make adverse statements against the mother, or withholding them to extract concessions, constitutes parental alienation and will severely damage the father’s custody case.
Do not file retaliatory criminal complaints against the wife’s family without factual basis. Courts have condemned the misuse of criminal processes in matrimonial litigation — Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273.
Do not engage in illegal surveillance, hacking of communications, or installation of tracking devices. Evidence so obtained may be inadmissible, and the conduct itself may constitute a criminal offence.

PART VI: ADULTERY VS. BIGAMY — A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL DISTINCTION

Adultery and bigamy are frequently conflated in popular discourse, but they are legally, criminally, and conceptually distinct offences with entirely different consequences in matrimonial proceedings.

Definitions

Adultery refers to the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with someone other than their lawful spouse. It is a violation of conjugal fidelity and constitutes a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(i) HMA. Following Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2018) 2 SCC 189, it is no longer a criminal offence. Bigamy refers to contracting a second marriage while the first marriage is still legally subsisting and the first spouse is alive. Section 82 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 494 IPC) makes bigamy a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. Section 17 of the HMA categorically declares the second marriage void.

Comparative Table: Adultery vs. Bigamy

Parameter	Adultery	Bigamy
Nature of wrong	Moral and matrimonial; breach of conjugal fidelity.	Legal and criminal; a fraudulent act creating a void marital status.
Criminal law	Decriminalised — Joseph Shine v. UOI (2018) 2 SCC 189. No criminal liability.	Punishable under Section 82/83 BNS. Up to 7 years imprisonment and/or fine.
Ground for divorce (HMA)	Section 13(1)(i) — and may also constitute cruelty under S. 13(1)(ia).	Section 13(1)(ii) — and constitutes the gravest cruelty. Second marriage void under Section 11.
Effect on marriage	Does not affect the validity of the first marriage.	Second marriage is absolutely void ab initio under Section 11 HMA r/w Section 17 HMA.
Standard of proof	Positive evidence or cogent circumstantial evidence; civil standard (balance of probabilities).	Proof of solemnisation of second marriage while first is subsisting.
Effect on children	No effect on legitimacy of children of the lawful marriage.	Children of the void second marriage are legitimate under Section 16 HMA; second wife has no matrimonial rights.
Maintenance impact	Post Joseph Shine, adultery of the wife is not an absolute bar to maintenance. “Living in adultery” under S. 144(4) BNSS remains a disqualifying condition.	Second wife has no right to maintenance as a wife. Children of the void marriage may claim maintenance independently.
Custody impact	Not decisive. Welfare of child is paramount. Adultery alone does not disqualify a parent from custody.	Bigamy is a criminal act; custody is still governed by welfare of child. The bigamous parent’s criminal conduct is one relevant factor.
Cruelty nexus	A persistent adulterous relationship, flaunted or deliberately concealed, can independently constitute mental cruelty — Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, AIR 1988 SC 121.	Commission of bigamy is itself the gravest form of cruelty. An independent ground for divorce is established by the very act.

Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav, AIR 1988 SC 644 The Supreme Court held that a second wife under a void bigamous marriage has no entitlement to maintenance as a wife under Section 125 CrPC. The Court expressed grave concern at the frequency of bigamous marriages in India and emphasised the need for strict enforcement. The vulnerability and hardship of women entrapped in such void unions was specifically acknowledged.

PART VII: CAN A WIFE COHABIT WITH ANOTHER MAN DURING PENDENCY OF DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS?

This question requires analysis at multiple levels. The answer is: no criminal prohibition exists, but the legal risks are serious and multi-dimensional.

The Criminal Law Position

Following Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2018) 2 SCC 189, cohabitation by a married woman with another man during the pendency of divorce proceedings is not a criminal offence. Section 497 IPC has been struck down as unconstitutional. However, the wife remains a married woman in law until the divorce decree is made absolute, and the absence of criminal liability does not mean legal neutrality.

Impact on Maintenance — The Most Immediate Risk

Section 144(4) of the BNSS (formerly Section 125(4) CrPC) provides that a wife is not entitled to maintenance if she is living in adultery. Section 25(2) HMA empowers the court to rescind a maintenance order if the wife is found to be living in adultery. Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal, AIR 1978 SC 1807 The Supreme Court held that “living in adultery” connotes a continuous adulterous relationship — a course of conduct, not a one-time occurrence. Open cohabitation with another man during the pendency of proceedings raises a strong inference of adultery which, if unrebutted, disentitles the wife to maintenance.

Practical Legal Advice: A wife who cohabits openly with another man during the pendency of divorce proceedings assumes serious and unnecessary legal risk — particularly the immediate financial risk of losing interim maintenance. The prudent legal course is to defer any such domestic arrangement until the divorce decree is made absolute.

Impact on Custody

The wife’s cohabitation with another man does not automatically disentitle her from custody. The welfare criterion remains paramount. However, the court will scrutinise the home environment she proposes to offer the child — including the nature of the relationship, the character and antecedents of the new partner, the stability of the arrangement, and whether the child’s exposure to it is likely to cause emotional harm. A stable, nurturing domestic arrangement may not be disqualifying; an unstable or acrimonious one will weigh against her — Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal, (2009) 1 SCC 42.

Impact on the Matrimonial Proceedings Themselves

The wife’s cohabitation may be relied upon by the husband as evidence of adultery under Section 13(1)(i) HMA, and as evidence of mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA, strengthening or expanding his petition.

Live-In Relationships and the PWDVA

The Supreme Court in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469 extended PWDVA protection to women in stable live-in relationships “in the nature of marriage.” However, this protection is premised upon both parties being free to enter such a relationship. A married woman whose divorce is pending cannot claim the full protection available to a woman in a free live-in relationship, and her new partner acquires no legal recognition as her spouse during the pendency of proceedings.

PART VIII: THE ADULTEROUS HUSBAND — LEGAL CONSEQUENCES AND THE WIFE’S REMEDIES

Adultery as a Ground for Divorce

Section 13(1)(i) HMA is gender-neutral. A wife is fully entitled to seek divorce on the ground of the husband’s adultery. A single act of voluntary sexual intercourse with a third party during the subsistence of the marriage suffices — habitual adultery or the keeping of a concubine need no longer be proved.

Adultery as Mental Cruelty — An Independent Ground

Even independently of Section 13(1)(i), a husband’s persistent adulterous relationship constitutes mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA, furnishing the wife with an additional and independently sufficient ground for divorce. Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, AIR 1988 SC 121 The Supreme Court held that cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA includes mental cruelty. A husband’s persistent extra-marital relationship, particularly where the wife is compelled to endure the public humiliation of the affair, constitutes grave mental cruelty of the highest order, warranting dissolution of the marriage on this ground alone. V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC 337 Mental cruelty must be of such a nature that it would be unreasonable to expect the petitioner to live with the respondent. Persistent humiliation — including through the open conduct of an adulterous relationship — falls squarely within this definition. The test is the impact of the conduct on the complaining spouse. A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 SCC 22 The Supreme Court reiterated that cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. A husband’s adulterous conduct, even if not physically violent, can constitute mental cruelty of such gravity as to make continued cohabitation impracticable and intolerable.

The Doctrine of Clean Hands — Defeating the Husband’s Petition

Section 23(1)(a) of the HMA provides that the court shall not pass a decree unless the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his own wrong. A husband who has himself committed adultery — and whose wife places this squarely before the court — may find the doctrine of clean hands operating to weaken or defeat his petition. Courts have invoked this doctrine to decline relief to a petitioner whose own conduct was blameworthy.

Evidence of the Husband’s Adultery

The wife must typically rely on circumstantial evidence. Courts have accepted: hotel records establishing cohabitation with a third party; call logs, WhatsApp messages, and emails evidencing the nature of the relationship; financial records showing expenditure on a third party; witness testimony; and social media evidence including photographs and check-ins. All electronic evidence must be properly certified under Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Shafhi Mohammad v. State of HP, (2018) 2 SCC 801.

The Adulterous Father and Custody

Consistently with the gender-neutral application of the welfare criterion, a father’s adultery does not automatically disentitle him from custody. However, where the husband seeks custody while openly cohabiting with a third party, the court will closely scrutinise the home environment he proposes to offer the child. The stability and nurturing quality of that environment — not moral condemnation of the father — will be the operative criterion — Nil Ratan Kundu & Anr. v. Abhijit Kundu, (2008) 9 SCC 413.

Maintenance and the Adulterous Husband

Maintenance under Section 25 HMA is calculated on the basis of need and means — not as a reward or punishment for matrimonial fault. However, a husband cannot deploy his wife’s technical defaults to defeat her maintenance claim where he himself is the adulterous party. Courts exercising discretion under Section 25 HMA have considered a husband’s adulterous conduct as a relevant circumstance in moulding relief — Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324.

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing analysis yields the following propositions as settled law:

The welfare of the child is the paramount and overriding consideration in all custody proceedings. No allegation of abandonment or adultery is a substitute for a welfare analysis grounded in evidence.
Abandonment requires proof of a voluntary, intentional, and permanent relinquishment of parental responsibility. Separation caused by matrimonial conflict or cruelty is not abandonment in law.
Adultery, even where proved, does not ipso facto render a parent unfit for custody. The relevant question is whether the parent’s conduct demonstrably harms the child’s welfare.
Post Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2018) 2 SCC 189, adultery is decriminalised. It may remain a ground for divorce and a relevant factor in maintenance, but is not a presumptive disqualifier from custody.
Bigamy is categorically distinct from adultery — it is a criminal offence, renders the second marriage void ab initio, and constitutes the gravest matrimonial cruelty, providing multiple independent grounds for divorce and relief to the first wife.
A wife who cohabits with another man during the pendency of proceedings faces no criminal prosecution, but assumes serious legal risk — particularly the immediate risk of losing interim maintenance. The prudent course is to defer such arrangements until the decree absolute.
A husband who commits adultery during the subsistence of the marriage furnishes the wife with powerful grounds for divorce under both Section 13(1)(i) and Section 13(1)(ia) HMA, and his conduct may influence the court’s approach to maintenance and custody.

TABLE OF CASES CITED

Case Name	Citation	Relevance
A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur	(2005) 2 SCC 22	Mental cruelty; adulterous conduct of husband.
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar	(2014) 8 SCC 273	Misuse of criminal process in matrimonial disputes.
D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal	(2010) 10 SCC 469	Live-in relationships; PWDVA coverage.
Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal	(2009) 1 SCC 42	Welfare factors; no gender rule in custody.
Gita Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India	(1999) 2 SCC 228	Mother as equal natural guardian; Section 6 HMGA.
Joseph Shine v. Union of India	(2018) 2 SCC 189	Decriminalisation of adultery; women’s autonomy.
K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa	(2013) 5 SCC 226	Mediation in matrimonial disputes.
Lahari Sakhamuri v. Sobhan Korada	(2019) 7 SCC 311	Parental misconduct and custody; welfare.
Mausami Moitra Ganguli v. Jayant Ganguli	(2008) 7 SCC 673	Abandonment allegations; acrimonious litigation.
Nil Ratan Kundu & Anr. v. Abhijit Kundu	(2008) 9 SCC 413	Comprehensive welfare analysis; visitation rights.
Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh	AIR 1971 SC 1153	Bigamy; right to divorce crystallises on second marriage.
Rajnesh v. Neha	(2021) 2 SCC 324	Maintenance guidelines; conduct of parties.
Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal	AIR 1978 SC 1807	“Living in adultery” as maintenance disqualifier.
Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal	AIR 1973 SC 2090	Children not chattels; welfare as sole criterion.
Roxann Sharma v. Arun Sharma	(2015) 8 SCC 318	Adultery does not disentitle mother from custody.
Saraswathy v. Babu	(2014) 3 SCC 712	PWDVA not barred by divorce proceedings.
Shafhi Mohammad v. State of HP	(2018) 2 SCC 801	Admissibility of electronic evidence.
Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi	AIR 1988 SC 121	Adultery as mental cruelty; husband’s conduct.
Surya Vadanan v. State of Tamil Nadu	(2015) 5 SCC 450	Child removal from jurisdiction without court sanction.
V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat	(1994) 1 SCC 337	Mental cruelty; unreasonableness test.
Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh	(2017) 3 SCC 231	Parental alienation; immoral conduct allegations.
Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao S. Adhav	AIR 1988 SC 644	Bigamy; second wife’s rights in void marriage.
Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan	(2020) 3 SCC 67	Custody not reward or punishment; welfare paramount.

Disclaimer: This article is published by the Law Chamber of Amit K Pateria for general informational and scholarly purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice for any specific case or client. All citations should be verified from authorised law reports (SCC, AIR) before reliance in court proceedings. Readers are advised to consult a qualified family law practitioner for advice specific to their circumstances. The rules of the Bar Council of India prohibit lawyers and law firms from soliciting work or advertising in any manner.